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1 Introduction
The growing importance of mass distribution deeply transformed the
balance of power between producers and retailers. In récent years, the nuin-
ber of products sold by grocery stores lias grown faster than shelf space
at the retail level. Retailers can choose among an ever increasing number
of products. Producers compete in order to obtain the listing of their pro
ducts, and in this process confer a stronger bargaining power to retailers,
who can threaten to outlist their products to obtain more profitable retail
conditions.
Hence the balance of power between producers and retailers no lon
ger systematically advantages manufacturers. Retailers' bargaining power
lias increased, and sometimes they even hâve taken control of producers
which hâve become subcontractors1. Récent mergers between large retailers
emphasize this évolution. Thèse changes hâve conséquences on vertical rela-
tionships, and significant implications on compétition policy. The increase
in retailers' buying power may indeed hâve several effects on welfare. By
lowering wholesale priées, retailers' power may lower retail priées and en-
hance consumers' surplus. But an imbalance between suppliers and retailers
may also hâve detrimental effects on consumers' surplus and on welfare2,
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distorting both retail and producer compétition, reducing producers' incen
tives to innovate, and even eliminating some producers from the market.
Il miglit tlien be worth taking into account and measuring tins balance of
power in vertical structures.
Yet the économie theory of vertical relationships lias traditionally gi-
ven a dominant position to producers in their relationship to retailers. In
particular, the literature on vertical restraints3 usually analyses the impact
of a contracting condition imposed by one producer on several retailers in
a Principal-Agent model. Even though some models happen to consider
several compétitive producers4, most of thern assume that retailers are per-
fectly compétitive : this assumption seems rather unrealistic and prevents
from taking their relative bargaining powers into account.
Contrary to the classical literature on this subject, Shaffer (1991)
proposed a model presenting a market for a homogeneous good produced
by perfectly compétitive manufacturers and sold by a differentiated retail
duopoly. The usual balance of power is reversed : retailers can appropriate
the whole profit of the vertical structure by requiring slotting allowances,
that is fixed fées paid by manufacturers to obtain listing guarantees. Slotting
allowances can be interpreted as négative franchise fées.
The strength of compétition at each level of the vertical structure thus
seems to be a basic déterminant of the balance of power between produ
cers and retailers. A monopolisée producer facing a compétitive distribution
network can impose his conditions, whereas a perfectly compétitive manu-
facturing sector facing a retail oligopoly, as in Shaffer (1991), lias a reduced
roorn for manoeuvre. A double duopoly model (upstream and downstream)
seems adéquate to integrate imperfect compétition at both levels of the ver
tical structure. In such a setting in which both products and retailers are
differentiated, Dobson and Waterson (1996) consider the private and social
desirability of exclusive trading contracts between producers and retailers.
In this paper, we focus on the sharing of profits between the firras. without
vertical restraints, to study the balance of power between upstream and
downstream firms.
As far as the balance of power between producers and retailers is
concerned, a good indicator can be obtained in comparing their relative
margins. Hence Steiner (1985) proposed a simple rule to détermine their
relative market powers, dépending on consumers' préférences for brand or
store :
"A good rule of thumb to détermine the relative market power of retai
lers and manufacturers goes as follows. If consumers are more disposed to
switch brands within store than stores within brand, retailers dominate
manufacturers. Retail margins will be relatively high and those of manufac
turers relatively low. When consumers are more disposed to switch stores
within brand than brands within store, the above market power and margin
relationships are reversed".
3 For a gênerai présentation of Ihe subject, see Katz (1989).
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Thèse consumers' préférences can be interpreted in ternis of horizontal
differentiation and their impact on pricing décisions can be evaluated.
This paper proposes a double duopoly model, in vvhich two producers
compete in priées with horizontally differentiated products, and face two
horizontally differentiated retailers also competing in priées5. We study the
setting of the margins at the two levels of the market. The parameter de-
fined as the différence between the two degrees of differentiation is a good
indicator of consumers' préférence for the brand or the store : when retailers
are more differentiated than producers, consumers actually switch brands
more readily than stores, because switching costs are lower. Assuming that
the value of this parameter is common knowledge, we can thus study its
impact on the fixing of wholesale and retail priées, and on the margins.
In this simple setting, we show that when producers are more differen
tiated than retailers, their margins are higher than retailers5. On the other
hand, when retailers are more differentiated than producers, they dominate
the relationship and their margin is higher than producers'. The différence
of the degrees of differentiation lias a significant impact on the balance of
power between producers and retailers.
We présent the model in section 2. The symrnetric equilibrium prices




Consider two manufacturers A and B producing two horizontally dif
ferentiated goods with the saine constant marginal cost c. Two retailers,
1 and 2, are horizontally differentiated and each of them sells both goods.
Without loss of generality, the marginal retailing costs are set equal to zéro.
We assume that producers are unable to set up shop and sell independently.
Thus, four differentiated goods are available for consuniers to purchase : firm
A's product at store 1, which is called Al, firm A's product at store 2, called
A2, and similarly Bl and B2.
Consumers are uniforinly distributed on the rectangle6 (see Figure 1)
where product Al is located at the origin, A2 at the point of coordinates
(a,0), product Bl at the point of coordinates (0,{3) and product B2 at the
point of coordinates (a,/?). This représentation allows us to point out two
5 It could refer for example to spatial differentiation.
6 The location of the firms is exogenous. /3 is fixed. The comparison of différent values of q might refer, for
instance, to the comparison of différent linear ciliés with the same total population, where the stores, located
at the two ends of each city, are distant from a and seil both goods.362 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 68(3), 2002
types of differentiation : the rectangle's width /?(/?€ [0, +oo[) represents
the producers' differentiation on the vertical axis while its length a (a e
[0, -f oo[) represents the retailers' differentiation on the horizontal axis. Let
t be the différence a — j3. When t ^ 0, retailers are less differentiated than
producers, and consumers "are more disposed to switch stores within brands
than brands within stores". On the contrary, when t ^ 0, retailers are more
differentiated than producers.
To keep the population constant whatever the values of parameters
a and /?, the consumers' density is set equal to 1//3 vertically and Ifa
horizontally. The global population is thus normalized to 1. As a matter
of convenience, we assume that each consumer located on the rectangle
purchases zéro or one unit of lus preferred good. Figure 1 shows the situation











This représentation of consumers préférences is an extension of Ho-
telling's model with two dimensions7. The coordinates of a consumer in the
products space may be interpreted in terms of double horizontal differen
tiation. A consumer located at a point of coordinates (x, y) has a preferred
store that would be x away from store 1 and (a — x) away from store 2;
similarly he has a preferred product that would be y away from product
A and (0 — y) away from product B. His preferred variety would therefore
7 For a similar représentation of double differentiation, see Matutes and Regibeau (1988). Other double
differentiation models, as Dobson and Waterson (1996), impose an affine demand which allows to take
double marginalisation effects into account. On the contrary, our extension of Hotelling's model allows to
endogenise demand, but its study requires to assume that the market is covered.Marie-Laure Allain . 363
be (x 4- y) away from product Al. Notice that the two dimensions of dif
ferentiation are fully separable8. Consumers hâve simple utility functions,
which dépend on their réservation price, their coordinates in the products
space and the price of the good they purchase. We assume that consumers
differ only by their location in the rectangle and that they ail hâve the same
réservation price d.
A consumer located at point (x, y) lias a utility of :
- If he buys one unit of good Al : U(Al) = d — (x + y) — pA\
- If he buys one unit of good Bl : U(B1) —d — (x + j3 — y) — pBX
- If he buys one unit of good A2 : U(A2) = d- (a — x + y) — pA2
- If he buys one unit of good B2 : U(B2) = d-(a-x +J3-y) - pB2
where p/fcis the price of good / at store k. (I € {A,B}; A: € {1,2})
We assume that the whole market is served, i.e. that the réservation
price d is "sufficiently high". Hence we can define the équations of indiffé
rence borders between two goods, consumers located on this border being
indiffèrent between the two goods, and those located on one side of the
border or the other preferring one good or the other. Then the consumers1
indifférence borders are :
- between Al and A2 : xA=
- between Bl and B2 : xB =
- between Al and Bl : yi=
- between A2 and B2 : y2 =










- between A2 and Bl : y - x =
This means that a consumer located at point {x,y) will prefer to
purchase good A at store 1 rather than at store 2 if x ^xA. Similarly, if
y^yi, he will prefer to buy good B rather than good A at store l9.
2.2 Détermination of the demand functions
8 This assumption seems realistic, as it seems intuitive that retailers1 differentiation relies mostly on géographie
differentiation, whereas brands' differentiation relies on consumers' heterogeneous tastes.
9 Notice a few obvious properties of thèse borders : \y2 - yy \ = \xB - xA\, and indifférence border bet
ween AI and B2 {respectively between A2 and B1) contains the points y^ C\xB and yzC\x ^ (respectively
y-i f\xA and j/2 Hig)364 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 68(3), 2002
We suppose that retailers choose retail priées so that indifférence bor-
ders intersect inside the rectangle (this is sufRcient to obtain zéro demand
for one good) :
{xa,xb) € [0,a]2
(yi,î/2>€ [0,p]2
Moreover, we need to assume that xA ^ xb (<=>• yi ^2/2) in order to
write the dernand functions. We will check afterwards that the equilibrium
follows thèse assumptions. The symmetric case can be treated in the saine
way.
The demand for good Ik (I e {A,B};k € {1,2}) is represented by
the area in which consumers prefer to piirchase good Ik rather than any




(max{0,pA2 -pAl + pB1 -PB2})
8a/?
_ max{0, a - pA2 + pAi} * max{0,/? + pB2 -
—
max{0,p - pB] + pA\) * max{0, a + pB>i - Pb\





Notice that demand functions are not symmetric if indifférence bor-
ders do not coincide : the demand for each good varies with the four priées.
Figure 2 représentas the distribution of demand between the four goods.
A sufficient condition for the market to be covered is that V(/, k),I G
{A,B}, k € {1,2}, p}k ^ p where p = d - ^^ : then each consumer can
purchase at least one good with a positive surplus. In that case, total de
mand for the four goods is constant :
DAi + DB1 + DA2 + DB2 = 1
Notice that we focus hère on the distribution of the demand between
the four goods, and do not pay attention to the variations of total demand :
we consider that the market is "locally captive".Marie-Laure Allain 365
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In this model we use the usnal principal-agent structure, which en-
ables producers to make take-it-or-leave-it offers to retailers. We solve the
following three-stage game for its symmetric subgame-perfect Nash equili-
bria.
In the first stage, both manufacturers simultaneously propose con-
tracts to the retailers. Each contract consists of a single wholesale price
(wa or wb), franchise fées and slotting allowances are not allowed. Ma
nufacturers cannot price-discriminate10 between retailers. We assume that
contracte are published at the end of the first stage, and that no renegotia-
tion is possible11.
In the second stage, retailers accept or refuse to list manufacturers'
products. If they both accept to list at least one of the producers, thcy
behave as Bertrand competitors with differentiated products : they siniuï-
taneously set their retail priées pai, VA2-. Pbu Vbi-, and publish them. If a
retailer rejects both contracts, his réservation profit is 0.
In the third stage, consumers purchase one unit of their preferred good
provided that it leaves them with a positive surplus.
We solve the game by backward induction.
10 This assumption is legally founded, as price discrimination in a homogenous good market with linear pricing
is forbidden in most countries. Moreover, it is consistent with the fact that we focus on symmetric situations.
11 Introducing secret contracting in this game would considerably modify its solutions and give lise to renegotia-
tion-proofness problems. See O'Brien-Shaffer (1992).366 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 68(3), 2002
3 Equilibrium priées and profits
In the third stage, consumers buy one unit of their preferred good
knowing retail and wholesale priées (recall that we assumed that their ré
servation price is sufficiently high to allow the whole market to be covered).
In the second stage, each retailer sets profit-maximizing retail priées,
taking wholesale priées wA and wb and parameters a and (3 as given :
max ITa; = (pAk ~ u>a)DaIc + {PBk - wB)DBk
PAkiPllk
ke {1,2}
Solving those profit maximizing problems at the retail stage gives the
best response functions of the two retailers and détermines the System of
equilibrium retail priées {pai,Pa2,Pbi,PB2} as afunctionof {wA,wBya,p}.
In the first stage, each producer, anticipating retailers' reaction func
tions, maximizes the profit of the sale of his product to the two retailers :
max 11/ = {wj - c)(Dji + D12)
wl
le{A,B}
The résolution of the System of the first-order conditions is not easy,
because each first-order condition is of the second degree and dépends on
the four retail priées and the two wholesale priées. However, the symmetric
equilibrium appears to hâve a remarkably simple forin.
Proposition 1 The unique symmetric subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of
this game is as follows :
P*ai = P*A2 = P*B\ = Vbi = c + a+{3
Proof : see appendix 1. o
This is an equilibrium as long as the market is covered, Le. as long as
d ^ c + 3(Of.+/5'). The assumptions made earlier are satisfied : each good faces
a strictly positive demand (in fact, Dai = DBi — &A2 — Db2 = 1/4) d
xA ^ xB-
The corresponding profits are :Marie-Laure Allain 367
Wholesale priées correspond to the priées both producers would set
if they were to impose retail priées. If producer A could impose retail price
Pa and similarly B could impose retail price pb, they would maximize their
profits by setting retail priées equal to :
PA = PB = c + 0
In this model however, retail price maintenance is not allowed, so
that producers cannot influence retailers in their choice of retail priées.
However, since total demand is locally constant as we focus on cases where
the market is covered, the ensuing double marginalization problem does not
reduce the producers' profit : in spite of the foreseeable rise of retail priées
as a increases, producers do not modify wholesale priées; their profit neither
dépends on a nor on retail priées. Their margin is exactly (5.
Parameter a only influences retailers in the choice of their retail priées.
q exactly corresponds to the retail margin : when retailers are not differen-
tiated (a = 0), they are perfeetly compétitive and charge a zéro retail
margin. On the other hand, when a is relatively high in comparison with /3,
retailers are more differentiated than producers and face less compétition :
their margin is larger.
The différence between producers' and retailers' margins is equal to
t = a — p. This parameter also seems to be a relevant indicator of the
balance of power between producers and retailers : when t < 0, retailers
are "dominated" by rnanufacturers, in the sensé of Steiner, insofar as their
margins are lower than the producers'. On the contrary, when t ^ 0, the
retailers' margins grow larger than the producers', who now are dominated
in the vertical relationship.
However, this domination concept, relying on the comparison of mar
gins, should be cautiously interpreted in relative terms. The additive form
of the margins in equilibrium dépends on the assumption of fully separable
differentiation. Assuming locally constant demand, the entire weight of the
double marginalization is actually shifted onto consumers, and the margin
at one level of the market is not established at the expense of the margin at
the other level of the market. But, using the share of total profit among the
vertical structure as a proxy for the balance of power between the firms, our
model confirais Steiner's intuition and shows that the différence of the diffe-
rentiations between upstream and downstream firms influences the balance
of power between the firms.
4 Conclusion
This article proposes an interprétation of the balance of power bet
ween producers and retailers in terms of differentiation. In a market for368 . Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 68(3), 2002
two differentiated goods with a "locally captive" demand, we show that the
différence between the margins charged by producers and retailers dépends
on the différence of the differentiations between upstream and downstream
firms, which in fact indicates the relative degrees of compétition at each
level of the market.
However, thèse results hâve been obtained in a simple setting, and
in particular they are limited to the symmetric case. An interesting exten
sion would be to introduce exclusive dealing contracts, which rnight allow
foreclosure or outlisting stratégies. Such contracts might then change the
balance of power between upstream and downstream firms. The study of
exclusivity would require the détermination of the asymmetric equilibria of
the game and is left for future work.
Appendix
Sketch of Proof of Proposition 1
To détermine the symmetric equilibria of the game, we might first
calculate retailers' reaction functions, then reintroduce them in the pro
ducers' profit maximizing problem, and finally choose among the solutions
the symmetric ones. But the four first-order conditions given by the retai
lers' profit maximization problem are of the second degree, and dépend on
four variables. The analytical resolution of this System is not possible in
the gênerai case. It is easier to solve ail the équations simultaneously, with
the conditions of symmetry on wholesale and retail priées, and using the
implicit functions theorem.
In the second stage, retailers détermine retail priées as a function
of wholesale priées, which induces four first-order conditions. We define
the following notation : P = (pai,Pbi,Pa2,PB2) and W = (wa, tu b).. The
System of the four first-order conditions gives P as an implicit function of
W:P = P(W).
In the first stage, producers anticipate thèse conditions and maximize
their profits. The first order conditions détermine the following System :
dUA | dïlA ÔD _Q
ôwa dD ô
dnB | duB dD
dP
Let M be the Hessian matrix of retailers profit function. M is generi-
cally invertible.Marie-Laure Allain 369
We hâve J^- = N.VA. It is not simple to write N in the gênerai case.
But in order to look for symmetric Nash equilibria, we hâve the following
symmetry conditions : wA = wB = w, pA1 - pA2 and pBl = pB2. We can
show that any symmetric equilibrium vérifies pA\ = pA2 = pB\ = PB2 = P,
but the proof is tedious and is omitted hère. In that case, the matrix M
becomes :





We can now solve the four first-order conditions and the symmetry
conditions simultaneously, and the unique solution is as follows :
P = Pai = Pbi = PA2 = PB2 =c + a + (3
iv = wA = u>b = c + fi
We now hâve to check that tliis unique candidate is indeed an equili
brium, and that there is no possible profitable déviation, even asymmetric.
Let wb = c 4- 3. Fixing wA outside of the interval [c, wB + P] would leave
producer A with a négative profit. We verify that, whatever wA in this in
terval, the retailers' best response functions intersect at the point defined
b>' (p*ai = P*A2 ~ wa + a,p*m = pB2 = wB + a) which thus defines a
Nash equilibrium of the subgame. It is then straightforward to verify that
wA =c + (3 maximizes producer A's profit at the first stage.370 Recherches Économiques de Louvain - Louvain Economie Review 68(3), 2002
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